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ITALIAN DILEMMAS: HISTORY AND IDENTITY
“We built Italy, and now we must build Italians,”1 said Camillo Cavour, the first Prime Minister of Italy, a state that unified as late as 1861. The crow-
ning moment of the unification was the liquidation of the Papal States when Italian 
forces entered Rome on 20th September 1870. This idea – which is believed by many 
to be true even today, who subscribe to the argument that Italians still have to be bu-
ilt – is a perfect expression of the problem of Italian identity – or rather, the problem 
of the lack of it. Once unification had been achieved, Italy appeared on the political 
map of Europe as a fairly large state. Yet from its earliest days, the Italian state faced 
a major obstacle: the lack of historical tradition as a basis on which to build the ethos 
of the State. For before the 19th century there had been no form of statehood on the 
peninsula. The newly established state therefore was an entirely new phenomenon, 
with no history, tradition or common values and culture. The problem of a non-
existent Italian nation was even worse, as it was expected to crystallise around the 
unified state. The founders of Italy believed the new state would build the nation; 
and in order to perform this task, the state was forced to restrain and discipline va-
rious particular and regional interests. An Italian was primarily to be an Italian, and 
not a Roman, Genoese, Milanese, Piedmontese, Venetian, Tuscan or Sicilian.
“The young Sabaudian monarchy,” wrote Simona Colarizi, an Italian historian, 
“lying on the fringe of the Olympus of the powers that be, assumed the physiogno-
my of a liberal state on the road to democracy: there could be no other way. Liberals 
and democrats were those Italians who fought for the birth of the state, and it was 
on the liberal values that its institutional constitution was based.”2 Italy was the work 
of the Risorgimento: a major 19th century ideological and political movement that 
aimed at the unification of territories inhabited by Italians into a single state. The es-
tablishment of the new state was based on the political structures and institutions of 
1 Wielka Internetowa Encyklopedia Multimedialna, at <http://www.onet.pl>.
2 S. Colarizi, Storia del Novecento italiano, Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, Milano 2000, p. 6.
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the Kingdom of Sardinia–Piedmont, which made the postulates of the Risorgimento 
its official political programme. Yet the goals of the Risorgimento went beyond purely 
political matters: they also wanted to swiftly achieve a modern and progressive so-
ciety in Italy. Unfortunately, to quote Stanley G. Payne, “after 1860 much of this 
task was put off indefinitely, while many patriots considered the new Italian system 
– oligarchic, elitist, and economically tight – a pathetic decay or betrayal of high 
aspirations.”3 The Italian State was dominated by an elite composed of the bourgeoi-
sie and aristocracy of the North, which disregarded and held in contempt the poor 
southern part of the country. Constitutional monarchy was unacceptable for the 
republican faction, whose great political and intellectual leader, Giuseppe Mazzini 
was forced to emigrate. A fairly tight system of power, which lasted until the First 
World War, was developed, with only by those who could meet the high censuses 
being granted election rights. The country’s economy was weak, and despite an ac-
celeration in the process of industrialisation in the 1890s, Italy right up to the First 
World War remained a predominantly agricultural country, much poorer than other 
West European states.
The problems related to the lack of common national identity among the in-
habitants of the young state were quick to surface. Many of them were only, in the 
words of Colarizi, “Italians on paper,”4 as they felt no marked change in their social 
and political status, treating Italy with the same indifference that they exhibited to-
wards Habsburg, Bourbon or papal rule. National culture was being born in pain. 
Moreover, the scope of its impact was highly limited. This was caused partly by the 
high level of illiteracy (in 1881, 67% Italians were illiterate) and partly by the lack of 
a common language. Many inhabitants did not speak Italian but a variety of dialects, 
while so-called “high society,” the royal family included, spoke French. It is gener-
ally believed that Italian was not established as a commonly used language until the 
1960s, when the unification occurred thanks to the television.
Several attempts were made to construct a colonial empire in order to make up 
for the lack of success in internal policy, yet even these plans failed. France beat Italy 
when it came to subjugating Tunisia in 1881. Italy only managed to found two small 
colonies in Eritrea and Somalia. An attempt to subjugate Ethiopia ended in a humil-
iating defeat at Adua (1896) – the only victory of African troops against a European 
army in the 19th century. “As a consequence,” as S.G. Payne has noted, “Italy could 
not become Europe’s ‘sixth power,’ and was left with the role of a country similar to 
Spain, Greece or Portugal, only slightly larger.”5 The general mood improved a little 
after victory was achieved in the Turkish war (1911–1912) which gave Italy Libya 
and several islands in the Aegean Sea.
In May 1915, Italy joined the Entente in the First World War, and benefited 
from the conflict: the Paris peace conference gave Italy Trento, Trieste, Upper Adige, 
3 S.G. Payne, Il fascismo, Newton & Compton Editori, Roma 1999, p. 69.
4 S. Colarizi, Storia del…, p. 6.
5 Ibid.
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Istria and Dalmatia all of which had previously been under Austro–Hungarian rule. 
Consequently, the war effectively became the next stage of the Risorgimento – territo-
ries were acquired that were believed to be Italian. Nevertheless, Italy did not receive 
Fiume (Rijeka), which led to resentment throughout the country and withdrawal 
from the Peace conference.
In 1919, the Italian political stage saw the appearance of the fascist movement 
led by a former socialist, Benito Mussolini who adeptly capitalised on the frustration 
in society caused by hard economic conditions and the less than satisfactory results 
of the war. It was commonly believed that the Italian victory was “crippled” (vittoria 
mutilata). Fascism quickly spread. After the March on Rome (28 October 1922), 
the fascists seized power, and Mussolini assumed the post of the Prime Minister. The 
triumph of fascism ended the liberal period in the Italian history, which had begun 
with the establishment of the state. Now the State abruptly entered a new era.
The first years of Mussolini’s government turned the state into a peculiar kind of 
semi-dictatorship. The Prime Minister led a multi-party government, with only three 
other fascist ministers. The new cabinet did not seem very different from its pred-
ecessors. New qualities, however, were beginning to appear. In November 1922, the 
Parliament granted Mussolini the right to rule by decree for a year, in order for it to 
tackle the country’s economic problems. A month later, the Fascist Grand Council 
(Gran Consiglio del Fascismo) was established; formally, it was the managing body of 
the fascist party, yet the Council’s prerogatives went much further. The Council be-
gan to influence directly the policy of the state, and in 1928 it became an official or-
gan of the state and eclipsed the parliament. In January 1923, the party’s squadri were 
turned into a voluntary national security militia (Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza 
Nazionale), which became a state institution. Mussolini’s government achieved some 
economic and social successes, and was especially praised for bringing peace to the 
country. Little wonder that its authority was on the rise, and the National Fascist 
Party (Partito Nazionale Fascista – PNF) enrolled new members by the thousands. 
Towards the end of 1923, the Fascist Party had nearly 800,000 members. Twelve years 
later its membership rose to 2.7 million, and reached 3.6 million in 1941.
A major crises followed the kidnap and then the murder of a socialist MP, Giacomo 
Matteotti, by fascist thugs on 10th June 1924. The connections of Matteotti’s killers 
with high- ranking government officials were disclosed. Even though the personal 
involvement of Mussolini has never been proved, he was definitely responsible for it 
politically. This is what the outraged general public believed, as it turned away from 
the head of the government. Opposition MPs withdrew from the workings of the 
parliament and, following the example of the Roman plebeians from the 5th century 
BC, announced an “Aventine secession.” Fascists found themselves on the defensive, 
and Mussolini himself believed that he might be dismissed. As with 1922, the final 
decision was up to the King. Yet, despite the obvious advantages, the politically apa-
thetic Vittorio Emanuele III decided not to intervene again.
After some time had passed, and now convinced that he was no longer in jeop-
ardy, Mussolini launched his counteroffensive. On 3rd January 1925 he delivered his 
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famous address to the Parliament, announcing a sudden political turn. Twenty-six 
months after the March on Rome, Mussolini proclaimed “complete power for com-
plete fascism,” which was tantamount to transforming Italy into a full-fledged dicta-
torship. What is more, he assumed personal responsibility for the Matteotti murder, 
speaking swaggeringly that “if fascism has become a criminal association, then I am 
the leader of this criminal association.”6 For the first time, the police was ordered to 
arrest a group of political opponents, and opposition MPs who attempted to return 
to the Parliament.
Soon, the role of the Parliament was reduced only to approving governmental 
decrees. In the election of 1929, the voters received only one list, which they could 
support or reject. The electorate chose to support it by over 98%. A decade later 
the parliament was dissolved, and thereafter its function of political representation 
was assumed by the nominated Chamber of Fasces and Corporations (Camera dei 
Fasci e delle Corporazioni). Mussolini had managed to concentrate a vast amount 
of power in his hands. In addiction to being the Prime Minister, he presided over 
eight departments. He became Il Duce – the infallible leader of fascism and Italy. 
The slogans: “The Duce is always right” (Il Duce ha sempre ragione) and “To believe, 
to obey, to fight” (Credere, obbedire, combattere) became official slogans. Both the 
legal and education systems were fully fascistised. In 1926, after three unsuccessful 
attempts on Mussolini’s life (in one of them he suffered a slight nose wound), all 
political parties apart from the PNF and all non-fascist trade unions were declared 
to be illegal.
The Duce announced that the Italian state was totalitarian (stato totalitario). The 
fundamental principle of such a state was “nothing against the State, nothing out-
side the State, nothing without the State.”7 A leading fascist philosopher, Giovanni 
Gentile, wrote that “for fascism, everything is in the state, and nothing human or 
spiritual may exist or have any value outside the state. In this sense, fascism is totali-
tarian, and a fascist state provides the synthesis and unity of all the values: it shapes, 
realizes, and develops the entire life of the nation.”8 Fascism thus primarily attempted 
the consolidation of the state, and then placing it on a pedestal. While it remained 
true that the nation and national identity were important, they could develop only 
within the framework of the totalitarian state. The omnipotent state referred to the 
ideas of national solidarity and tolerated no political, social, class or professional 
conflict, hence the establishment of the corporations that became its basic structure. 
Those accused of anti-state and subversive activity faced a special tribunal, whose 
decisions were secret and severe, especially after the reintroduction of capital punish-
ment in 1927.
The totalitarian concept of the state was combined with the quest for a new, pow-
erful national identity for Italians. The tradition of ancient Rome became a great 
6 Quoted in S.G. Payne, Il fascismo, p. 126.
7 Quoted in K.D. Bracher, ‘Totalitarismo’ in Enciclopedia del Novecento, Roma 1984, Vol. 7, p. 721.
8 G. Gentile, Che cosa è il fascismo, La Fenice, Firenze 1925, p. 37.
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myth that was to support the national identity. The Italian nation was announced as 
being the inheritor and continuator of the Romans, and if this was so, greatness and 
grandeur had to be its appointed fate, therefore the nation had to strive to develop 
its own empire. “Latinity,” wrote P. Viola, “became something akin to a civil religion, 
whose task was to reinforce the efforts of the Italians to regain the greatness that was 
their due.”9 The moment the fascists assumed control over the country was consid-
ered to be the beginning of the new era: the Fascist era (era fascista).
In 1933, Germany fell under the sway of Adolf Hitler, who had always had a great 
deal of respect for Mussolini and considered the Duce to be his political master. 
Mussolini was gradually warming to Hitler. But during the 1920s he refused to send 
Hitler his autographed photo, and later – in private circles – frequently referred to 
German Nazism as a “parody of fascism.” In the second half of the 1930s the Duce 
was forced to come to terms with Hitler, especially as the dynamics of the Third 
Reich greatly exceeded the capacity of Italy. The two countries under two variations 
of fascism inexorably converged. Yet it was during this period that Mussolini sadly 
found himself being steadily reduced to the position of dictator minor, as the role of 
the dictator maior was reserved for the German Führer. In 1938, under the influence 
of Hitler, Mussolini announced the concept of “Italian racism,” which was accompa-
nied by the introduction of anti-Jewish legislation.
Envying the German conquests, while he himself could boast only of conquering 
Ethiopia (and not without great effort) in 1936, and eager to participate, together with 
Germany, in the new division of the world in the spirit of the imperial tradition of 
ancient Rome, Mussolini took Italy into the Second World War in June 1940. While 
Italian soldiers had fought bravely during the First World War, they now displayed 
complete military ineptitude and a lack of commitment to Mussolini’s war, which 
they did not consider to be their own. For this reason Italy’s military involvement 
was a long succession of defeats: a fact that shook the fascist regime and served to un-
dermine the Duce’s authority. On 25 July 1943, the Fascist Grand Council resolved 
to strip Mussolini of his power. Following this change, King Vittorio Emanuele III 
had him arrested and the post of the Prime Minister was entrusted to Marshal Pietro 
Badoglio, whose government opened negotiations with the Allies and later declared 
war on Germany. Confined to the mountain resort of Gran Sasso in the Apennines, 
Mussolini was rescued only after German troops, operating on Hitler’s personal or-
der and commanded by Colonel Otto Skorzenny, launched a spectacular raid. After 
the Duce had been brought to Germany, on 17 September 1943, fulfilling Hitler’s 
orders, he announced on Munich radio the dethronement of the Sabaudian dynasty 
and the establishment of the Italian Social Republic (Repubblica Sociale Italiana). 
Fully under German control, this bantam puppet state with its capital in the town 
of Salò situated over Garda Lake, in the northern part of Italy was controlled by 
German troops. Italian fascism was now returning to its republican roots which was 
to be reflected in the new name of the party: the Fascist Republican Party (Partito 
9 P. Viola, Il Novecento, Einaudi, Torino 2000, p. 96.
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Fascista Repubblicano – PFR). During this period Mussolini returned to highly leftist 
slogans, which advocated the “socialisation of the economy,” although an attempt to 
do so in the Salò Republic was forestalled by the Germans.
The history of the Salò Republic turned out to be an episode of less than two years. 
Towards the end of April 1945, when Germany’s defeat was inevitable, Mussolini – 
escorted by an SS squad – attempted to flee to Switzerland. On 27 April, the column 
was stopped at Dongo, close to the Swiss border by the Italian partisans. Dressed in 
the uniform of a German officer, Mussolini was identified and arrested. The next 
day, the Duce was executed at Como together with his long-time mistress, Claretta 
Petacci, who chose to die by his side. On 29 April, their bodies, hanging by their feet, 
were publicly displayed in Piazzale Loreto in Milan. This kind of macabre spectacle 
was a fascist invention: they had done the same thing in the recent past with the bod-
ies of captured partisans. Now came the time for revenge.
The end of the Italian dictator was a tragic one, yet so was the fate he had pre-
pared for his nation, depriving it of freedom for many long years and forcing it to 
endure the anguish of war. Mussolini’s mistake was not to have copied his Spanish 
protégé, General Francisco Franco, who – because he was capable of saying “no” to 
Hitler – not only survived the war unscathed but also managed to remain in power 
for the next three decades, not unlike another disciple of the Duce, António Salazar 
in Portugal.
Fascism made its mark not only on the Italian state but also on the entire Italian 
national conscience, which it distorted through its manipulations. An eminent 
Italian philosopher of a liberal predisposition, Benedetto Croce (who for a time was 
also fascinated with fascism, as he believed it to have some points in common with 
liberalism) expressed a highly controversial opinion while speaking in front of the 
Legislative Assembly in September 1945: “From 1860 to 1922, Italy was one of the 
most democratic countries of the world, while its development was a non-ruptured 
and generally swift advance along the path to democracy, naturally there is talk here 
of democracy with a liberal style, as each true democracy is.”10 Thus Croce expected 
that the post-war Italian state would be a simple continuation of pre-1922 Italy, and 
considered the fascist period as an interruption of the natural historical continuity 
– a certain ellipsis in the history of the country. Disregarding the opinion that pre-
fascist Italy was a blooming democracy, a theory that the facts do not support, Croce 
was mistaken in two matters. Firstly, in suggesting that fascism was an episode of 
little consequence and a taxing historical blunder whose experience could be fairly 
easily overcome; and secondly, his view that Italy must bridge the gap between the 
pre-fascist period and the post-fascist future – something which would be impossi-
ble to accomplish as post-war Italy had to become an entirely new political entity. 
The formula of a liberal pre-1922 state was strongly discredited. There was a rather 
common opinion that the helplessness and errors of the liberal system as well as its 
misalignment to the real needs of the nation had provided a fertile environment for 
10 Quoted in P. Alatri, Le origini del fascismo, Editori Laterza, Roma 1956, p. 163.
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the rise of fascism. After the war, Italy thus had to take shape following a double ne-
gation: rejecting both fascism and the model of the state that preceded it.
In the referendum of 2 June 1946, Italian citizens voted against the continuation 
of the monarchy, and instead opted for the establishment of a republic. At the same 
time, elections to the Constitutional National Assembly, a body that was to write 
the constitution for the new republic, were held. Three parties, namely Christian 
Democracy (Democrazia Cristiana – DC), the Italian Communist Party (Partito 
Comunista Italiano – PCI), and the Italian Socialist Party (Partito Socialista Italiano 
– PSI), obtained together nearly 75% of votes. For many years, until the late 1980s, 
these three parties were to be the leading actors of the country’s political stage and 
they decisively influenced the face of Italy.
The Constitution of 1948 was to be a powerful refutation of the fascist period. 
The memory of Benito Mussolini’s dictatorship resulted in the weakening of executive 
powers and the strengthening of the legislative. However, the parliament and cabinet 
system were ill-equipped to function effectively in a country famous for its hot tem-
per, where the people treat politics like a highly emotional game. One consequence of 
this was the weakness of Italian government. No control could be exerted by the presi-
dent, as his prerogatives were mainly restricted to purely representative functions.
Throughout Europe, Italy was perceived as a country of chaos that lacked sta-
bility. The most notable example was the lack of stable ruling coalitions. Cabinets 
changed as if they were in a kaleidoscope, so that an average Italian government re-
mained in office for no more than 10 months. Yet an incoming government was not 
usually much different from its predecessor, as it was composed of the same factions, 
and frequently shared the same ministers. Political games began to be the new reality, 
existing for their own sake. This resulted in a progressive alienation of politics and its 
severance from the society. Political practice in republican Italy strongly reinforced 
the political parties. They began to take primacy over state institutions – a phenom-
enon that has not developed, at least not to the same degree, anywhere else. One 
reason for this was the fact that no political formation obtained sufficient electoral 
support to govern independently. Even an alliance of two parties would not suffice 
to form a government. Governmental alliances had to encompass multiple players 
– four or five as a rule. In Italy, the decision about the shape of the government and 
both its programme and personal facet – which is of fundamental importance for 
democracy – was not made when it should have been, that is during the election, 
but during the post-election bickering between the elites of the leading parties. The 
vote, which was of crucial importance when it came to dealing with affairs of state, 
was in fact cast by party secretariats operating beyond civic control. This resulted in 
the hegemony of parties in Italian politics, in that the peculiar promotion of parties 
was achieved at the price of deforming democracy. Even prominent Italian academic 
books on constitutional law, which cannot be viewed as being frivolous, have always 
devoted much space to the question of partycracy (partitocrazia).11 Partycracy, which 
11 See Diritto costituzionale, Edizioni Simone, Napoli 1992, p. 95.
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manifested itself most fully in the Republic of Italy, was considered a degenerated 
democracy. Political parties, having appropriated the sovereign rights belonging to 
the nation, made sovereign decisions about the course and the future of the state, 
nominating the most senior positions in all institutions by the virtue of nomencla-
ture arrangements. The phenomenon, to quote L. Elia, “of a party occupying the 
state”12 became a highly negative political phenomenon specific to Italy. A. Manzella, 
in turn, spoke of “partycratic state.”13
It was not wholly surprising, then, that Christian Democracy became the sym-
bol of partycracy, as from 1945 to 1994 it formed the core of all the Italian cabi-
nets. What might be viewed as a paradox, the accusation of partycracy, was levelled 
against the Christian Democrats, even by their allies. The Christian Democrats not 
only felt perfectly at ease in this party-dominating system, but who were also ca-
pable of extracting political benefits from this situation. The leader of the Italian 
Republican Party (Partito Repubblicano Italiano – PRI), Giorgio La Malfa recog-
nised that “Christian Democracy became identified with the state,” and added that 
it was “sufficient to think what the control of Christian Democracy over the life of 
the entire country – the banks, RAI [public TV and radio – M.B.], public institu-
tions – to understand that the manner of voting in the elections depends on these 
power structures and on this unusually powerful nomenclature.”14 He was supported 
by the leader of the liberals (Partito Liberale Italiano – PLI), Renato Altissimo who 
claimed that “Christian Democracy, with the mere 30% of votes, possessed 90% of 
the power.”15
Only on rare occasions did the Christian Democrats rule single-handedly as a mi-
nority government. Government alliances, which connected Christian Democrats 
to the parties of the so-called “constitutional arch” (arco costituzionale) – that is the 
republicans, liberals, social-democrats, and the strongest faction in this group, the 
socialists – were the rule. Because of the continuous changes at the top and frequent 
breakdowns in the cabinets, Italy became legendary for its lack of political alterna-
tives. New governments, as has already been mentioned, were composed of virtually 
the same elements as their predecessors. The crystallisation of the governing political 
system proved to be a breeding ground for corruption, which eventually turned out 
to be the decisive factor behind the political change of the 1990s. Here one ought 
to pose a question about the reasons for this lack of political alternatives and the 
permanence of political elites, which was astonishing in a democratic system. The 
answer seems relatively easy: any potential change in Italy was blocked by what is 
frequently referred to as “the C factor,” namely the presence of the Communist Party 
12 L. Elia, ‘La peculiarità e l’evoluzione del sistema italiano riguardo ai partiti politici’ in Sindacato 
e sistema democratico, Il Mulino, Bologna 1975, p. 178.
13 A. Manzella, Il parlamento, Il Mulino, Bologna 1991, p. 58.
14 Quoted in Przegląd Międzynarodowy, Polska Agencja Prasowa, Warszawa, 30 August 1991, Wokół 
sondażu nt. “Włoskiej nomenklatury”, p. 19.
15 Ibid.
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– the strongest communist party of the Western world. For many years the Party was 
believed to be working against the system, that is questioning the foundations of the 
state’s constitution and calling for radical changes. Until 1989, which brought about 
a significant weakening of global communism, Italy, as G. La Malfa rightly noticed 
“was a front state.”16 In other words, it was the Western democracy most threatened 
by communism. “We had,” continued La Malfa “a system with an opposition so 
radical that it could only be sentenced to remaining outside of the system.”17 This 
situation ensured that there could be no possibility of a left-wing opposition to the 
governing system. A rightist opposition was even less likely because the Italian right 
wing was represented by an organisation of fascist provenience, i.e. the Italian Social 
Movement – National Right Wing (Movimento Sociale Italiano – Destra Nazionale 
– MSI-DN).18
Thus the political stage of the country was dominated by the fundamental oppo-
sition of two huge parties, each of which represented approximately 30% of electoral 
votes: the perennially governing Christian Democrats and the Communist Party 
– always in opposition, because second one lastingly subjected to the operation of 
the specific conventio ad excludendum19. For nearly five decades major groups of the 
electorate engaged in negative political behaviour, consistently voting against various 
measures. Many of the votes cast for Christian Democrats did not necessarily reflect 
support for their programme, but were instead cast in opposition to communism. 
The situation in the Italian party system was referred to as an imperfect two-party 
system (bipartitismo imperfetto).20 The essence of the imperfectness of the Italian 
two-party system was that the two big parties mentioned above did remained un-
changed in government. The deadlock in the system of power and the lack of change 
in the state’s ruling class brought about numerous negative phenomena, including 
the partycracy mentioned above, as well as corruption and the obscure connections 
between the politicians and the world of organised crime, i.e. the mafia.
Despite all this, one should remember that post-war Italy achieved major eco-
nomic progress, becoming one of Europe’s most powerful economies. Italy’s standard 
of living improved greatly, mainly as a result of the impressive economic boom of the 
1950s and 1960s, generally referred to as the “economic miracle” (miracolo econom-
ico). The crisis in politics, a fairly permanent phenomenon, was in a way overcome 
and separated from the life of society and from economic activities which followed 
16 G. La Malfa, G. Turani, Le ragioni di una svolta, Sperling & Kupfer Editori, Milano 1992, p. 1.
17 Ibid., p. 55.
18 See P. Ignazi, Il polo escluso. Profilo storico del Movimento Sociale Italiano, Il Mulino, Bologna 
1989 and M. Bankowicz, ‘Faszyzm w życiu politycznym powojennych Włoch’ in J. Končelík, 
B. Köpplová, I. Prázová, J. Vykoukal (eds.), Rozvoj české společnosti v Evropské unii, MatfyzPress, 
Praha 2004, Vol. 3, pp. 197-210.
19 Cf. P. Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti. Evoluzione e crisi di un sistema politico 1945-1996, 
Il Mulino, Bologna 1997, p. 425.
20 This term was first used by G. Galli, who used it for the title of his book, Il bipartitismo imperfetto. 
Comunisti e democristiani in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna 1966.
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their own course. Giulio Andreotti, one of the leading politicians of post-war Italy, 
who served seven times as the Prime Minister, claimed that Italians found a method 
of governing in crisis, and as a consequence of this the phenomenon of “stable insta-
bility” appeared.21 The situation in the country was perfectly portrayed by a title in 
the French press: the headline over a description of contemporary Italy went “Eppur 
si muove!” (But it does move!). In this context, the words attributed to Galileo re-
ceived a new significance, meaning that despite all the limitations, crises, and trouble 
Italy does move forward.22
In 1989, Central and Eastern Europe became the stage of the famous “autumn 
of the nations,” the result of which was the fall of the world communist system. 
Everything suggested that this would lead to certain processes and value changes 
within the PCI, but not deep enough for us meaningfully to talk about a funda-
mental turn. Only a few believed that such a radical political change would take 
place in Italy. Since 1956, Italian Communists had broken from Moscow, they re-
jected the principle of unity in the world’s communist movement, and instead de-
veloped the idea of an “Italian path to socialism.” This standpoint and at the same 
time the party’s independence found their expression, for instance, in the PCI’s sup-
port of the “Prague spring” of 1968 and its subsequent determined disapproval of 
the military intervention of the communist states in Czechoslovakia.23 During the 
1970s, under the leadership of Enrico Berlinguer, the PCI clearly chose the strategy 
of Euro-communism: an attempt to reconcile the traditional ideals of the commu-
nist movement and the requirements of parliamentary democracy and a free mar-
ket economy. At that time Italian Communists were already openly criticising the 
so-called real socialism, acknowledging that the Soviet Union and other commu-
nist countries had perverted Marxism, in whose name those states imposed highly 
repressive dictatorships. This resulted in what P. Ginsborg, a British historian spe-
cialising in Italian affairs, has called the “atrophy of Italian communism.”24 Yet, the 
PCI – less and less communist in its programme and political line – retained its 
historical name.
Nevertheless, the 1989 collapse of communism, both in its capacity as a system 
of government and as an ideology, posed a certain challenge for Italian communists, 
as it forced them to look for a new identity in this new world. The view that the 
communist collar was more and more oppressive and restrictive for the party, and 
for that reason it should be done away with, began to gain ground within the party. 
In 1990, during an extraordinary congress of the PCI, a decision was reached to 
terminate the 69-year-long history of the party and to reject completely its Marxist 
21 G. Andreotti, Governare con la crisi, Rizzoli, Milano 1991, p. 421.
22 See J. Zakrzewska, Ustrój polityczny Republiki Włoskiej, Warszawa 1986, p. 14.
23 See P. Demartis, ‘PCI e Cecoslovacchia: la forma e la sostanza’, Mondo Operaio, Gennaio-Febbraio 
1989, pp. 15-18.
24 See P. Ginsborg, L’Italia del tempo presente. Famiglia, società civile, Stato 1980-1996, Einaudi, Torino 
1998, pp. 293-309.
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and Leninist heritage.25 The PCI was replaced by the Democratic Party of the Left 
Wing (Partito Democratico della Sinistra – PDS), which defined itself as a demo-
cratic party working on the grounds of reformist socialism. The orthodox wing of 
the old Communist Party, which never came to terms with its dissolution and con-
sidered such a step to be “political treason,” formed a group under the name of the 
Communist Refoundation Party (Rifondazione Comunista – RC) which later – a fact 
that is worth emphasising – managed to consistently secure parliamentary represen-
tation, though markedly smaller than that of the PDS.
Many observers of the Italian political stage argued that since the Italian commu-
nists were experiencing acute difficulties as a result of their attempt to change their 
identify, Christian Democracy would continue its hegemony within the state and 
would be able to dictate political conditions in Italy for decades to come. It was said 
that Italy would evolve from an “imperfect two-party system” to a system that pos-
sessed a single dominant part. Yet these forecasts never came to pass.
The wave of major corruption scandals in 1992-1993 led to a political “earth-
quake.” The media almost daily publicised stories of corruption and fraud that in-
volved leading representatives of the political class. For a period in 1992, the prosecu-
tion conducted inquiries into every third member of the parliament, including five 
party leaders, four former prime ministers, and many members of former govern-
ments. The parliamentary election of March 1994 wiped out nearly all the previous 
political establishment from the political stage. Changes of party names and symbols, 
e.g. in 1994 Christian Democrats transformed themselves into the Italian Popular 
Party (Partito Popolare Italiano – PPI) were to no avail; even the removal of the most 
disgraced politicians did little to revive the party’s fortunes. The voters, disgusted with 
the enormity of the disclosed corruption, put their weight behind a number of rival 
parties, including Forza Italia (FI), a formation set up two months before the elec-
tions by the billionaire, Silvio Berlusconi. Those parties that had reputations for being 
against the system also gained increased support, like the Northern League (Lega Nord 
– LN) that propagated federalist slogans and did not exclude the possibility of the 
dissolution of the Italian state, and the National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale – AN) 
based on the neo-fascist MSI-DN. The post-communists were the only party within 
the traditional system to survive politically, but this was only because they had not 
participated in government and were therefore safe from major scandals. Berlusconi 
achieved an unprecedented triumph within a state that possessed an established dem-
ocratic regime. His party, which had existed for little more than two months, won the 
election with the highest share of votes (21%) and the largest number of MPs.26
25 See the documents of the 19th Congress of the PCI, The Italian Communists, January-March 1990, 
and especially the programme presentation of the then leader of the party, Achille Occhetto entitled 
A new beginning: the constituent phase of a new political formation, pp. 100-159.
26 Interesting material on the establishment of Forza Italia and the campaign ran by the group before 
the elections of 1994 can be found in E. Poli in the book entitled Forza Italia. Strutture, leadership 
e radicamento territoriale, Il Mulino, Bologna 2001, pp. 43-71. See also: P. Ginsborg, L’Italia del 
tempo presente…, pp. 538-556.
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The elections of 1994 are considered to be a turning point, in that they opened 
up a new period in the history of Italy. This was reflected in the terminology that 
was employed: it was said that the First Italian Republic was replaced by the Second 
Italian Republic. This, however, was an exaggeration and the facts scarcely support 
such an assertion. Although parties that had governed the country continually since 
the end of the Second World War were removed from the government, no signifi-
cant constitutional changes were enacted, despite many attempts, and therefore the 
system remained fundamentally unchanged.
In the 1990s major cracks appeared in the construction of the Italian state and for 
the first time they could be clearly seen. The danger of the Balkanisation of Italy due 
to the increasing number of internal conflicts, and the increasingly pronounced op-
position of individual parts of the state, began to loom large. This process was related 
primarily to the activity of the ever more influential Northern League, which joined 
the club of the most important participants in Italian politics. The League called in 
to question the integrity of the state as well as the justification and advisability of the 
Republic of Italy’s continued existence in its present form.
The Northern League, as Umberto Venturini correctly remarked, is the “most 
controversial political party of Italy.”27 It was established in 1979, when the un-
known would-be physician, Umberto Bossi, established the North-Western Union 
of Lombardy for Autonomy (in Italian – UNOLPA), which was soon transformed 
into the Lombard Autonomist League (Lega Lombarda – LL), which was eventually 
replaced by the Northern League in 1991.28 Bossi’s grouping started as an organisa-
tion of Lombard separatists. The more moderate ones spoke of the need to ensure 
the broad autonomy for Lombardy within a federalised Italy, while radicals open-
ly talked about liquidating Italy and establishing an independent Lombardy. Bossi 
himself vacillated on this issue, and at different times included federalist or inde-
pendence slogans into his programme. The League recognised as its patron Alberto 
da Guissano, a knight whose forces defeated the armies of Frederic Barbarossa at the 
Battle of Legnano in 1176. This ancient event was to be the source of ethos for the 
Lombards – a nation separate and clearly distinct from Italy. Later, the Celtic origin 
of the Lombards was strongly emphasised.29 This was accompanied by the feeding 
of the antagonism between the North and the South. Nowadays, the League pro-
claimed, the Lombard nation is forced to defend its own history, culture and lan-
guage, and its social and moral values in the hard struggle against aliens, including 
Italians, and especially those from the South. For that reason, the national identity of 
the Lombards had to be stirred up in order to develop among them a sense of com-
munity on the one hand, and a feeling of otherness – if not superiority – over aliens 
27 U. Venturini, ‘A Biographical Profile of Three Emerging Leaders: Mario Segni – Giorgio La Malfa 
– Umberto Bossi’, Italian Journal. A Bi-Monthly Digest of Italian Affairs, No. 2-3 (1992), p. 15.
28 The genesis and operation of the Lombard Autonomist League are appropriately characterised by 
D. Vimercati in the book entitled I Lombardi alla nuova crociata. Il “fenomeno Lega” dall’esordio al 
trionfo, Mursia, Milano 1990.
29 For more information, see G. Caldiron, La destra plurale, Manifestolibri, Roma 2001, pp. 62-63.
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on the other. One of the League’s manifestos said: “It does not matter how old you 
are, what you do, and what political tendency you follow. The only thing important 
is the fact that you are – that we are – Lombards.”30 Here we deal with a specific sac-
ralisation of the Lombard nation; put simply, they believed themselves to be better 
than the others. This perception of hostility towards outsiders brought charges of 
racism against the League. In his analysis, L. Manconi referred to the League’s activ-
ists as being the “entrepreneurs active in the field of intolerance.”31 Bossi realised that 
his faction was perceived as racist and populist. “They say,” he wrote in his autobi-
ography, “that I am closely related to Jean-Marie Le Pen, and that the League is the 
voice of the racist Lombardy.”32 He would, however, stalwartly oppose such a charge, 
claiming that he turned his attention to the rights of Lombardy and its people not 
for racist or populist reasons, but because he believed in federalism, for it was federal-
ism that formed – he believed – the core of the League’s programme. Moreover, Bossi 
disagreed with comparisons made between him and Mussolini. He argued that there 
were no similarities, notably because, unlike Mussolini who “marched on Rome,” he 
would lead a “march from Rome.”33 His “march from Rome” was to be the symbol 
of the federalist and decentralist programme of the League.
The League has always been perceived as a group making reference to regional na-
tionalism, criticising what they believed to be the centralised Italian state and its in-
stitutions, controlled by, to quote verbatim, “Roman parties.”34 It was not, however, 
only an anti-party and anti-institutional group, for it went further: it was an anti-sys-
tem grouping, if not an anti-state one. It did postulate, as has been mentioned above, 
the liquidation of Italy by breaking the country into independent regions.
The League’s radicalism reached its peak in mid-1990s. On 15th September 
1996, in Venice, in the presence of 20,000 supporters, Bossi announced the inde-
pendence of Padania: a new sovereign state which was to encompass northern and 
central Italy, namely: the Aosta Valley, Emilia-Romagna, Friuli – Venezia Giulia, 
Liguria, Lombardy, Marche, Piedmont, Tuscany, Trident – Upper Adige, Umbria, 
and Veneto. Neither the Padan State nor any other political construct of a simi-
lar character has ever existed. The name of Padania was devised by Bossi himself, 
as he believes that there exists a historical, cultural and socio-economical identity 
of the “people of the Po valley.”35 The Padanian Declaration of Independence was 
modelled on the 1776 American Declaration of Independence. “We, the nations of 
30 Quoted in I. Diamanti, La Lega, Donzelli Editore, Roma 1993, p. 56.
31 L. Manconi, ‘Imprenditori dell’intolleranza’ in L. Balbo, L. Manconi, I razzismi reali, Feltinelli, 
Milano 1992, pp. 82-87.
32 U. Bossi, D. Vimercati, Vento dal Nord. La mia Lega, la mia vita, Sperling & Kupfer Editori, 
Milano 1992, p. 143.
33 B. Vimercati, ‘La storia’ in U. Bossi, B. Vimercati, La Rivoluzione. La Lega: storie e idee, Sperling 
& Kupfer Editori, Milano 1993, p. 109.
34 See G. Statera, Come votano gli italiani. Dal bipartitismo imperfetto alla crisi del sistema politico, 
Sperling & Kupfer Editori, Milano 1993, p. 52.
35 See B. Vespa, La sfida, Sperling & Kupfer Editori, Milano 1998, p. 254.
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Padania,” it reads “solemnly announce: Padania is a federalist, independent, and sov-
ereign Republic.”36 After the declaration, the Italian flag went down the mast and 
was replaced with the green and white flag of Padania. Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, then the 
President of Italy, warned Bossi that although the Italian state guaranteed its citizens 
freedom of speech, it could not tolerate illegal acts. A criminal case against Bossi and 
other leaders of the league was considered, but was finally rejected as the support for 
independence of Padania turned out to be marginal (only 7% of Italian citizens de-
clared that they supported the idea of an independent Padania). With the passage of 
time, the initiative now seems to have been a political peculiarity. After a few years, 
the Northern League underwent another political evolution, it adopted a more mod-
erate agenda, and without officially repudiating the idea of an independent Padania, 
announced that it would now aim for the federalisation of Italy. Furthermore, over 
the League’s political success came to an end, as its support decreased in the polls. 
The League’s weakening position led to it becoming less dynamic and served to re-
duce the radicalism of its professed views. An expression of this moderate strategy 
was the League’s participation in the Berlusconi’s governmental alliance in 2001.
The League persistently maintained that the political system of Italy is based on 
the exploitation of the North by the South. The rich and industrious North pro-
duces the bulk of Italy’s GNP, which to a large extent is wasted by the poor and lazy 
South. Why is it so? The League’s answer is simple: because the state is governed by 
Southerners connected to the mafia.
By emphasising the disparities between the Italian North and the Italian South, 
the League touched upon a real problem. By exposing these differences, it could 
count on being understood and, therefore, that it would attract a great deal of sup-
port among the electorate in the north of the country where – having been influ-
enced by the League’s views – people began to consider seriously the idea of a divided 
Italy. There was a growing belief that if this did occur, then their standard of living 
would almost automatically greatly improve.
Research recently conducted in Italy proved that if the South became a separate 
country, it would be the poorest EU state in terms of per capita GDP. Unemployment 
in the region ranges from 30% to 50% and is also the highest in the entire EU. On 
the other hand, the North would stand a realistic chance of obtaining the title of be-
ing the EU’s richest state. It is a fact that there is an economic gap between the two 
halves of the country; this fact undermines the reputation of the Italian state, which 
for decades either did not want or was simply unable to bridge this gap.
An Italian analyst, P. Chiantera-Stutte, has noted that one of the key reasons for 
the success of the Northern League has been the fact that during its entire ‘life’ the 
Italian state has never solved the so-called “national question.”37 This was clearly re-
36 Quoted in M. Jędrysik, ‘Narodziny Padanii’, Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw), 16 September 1996.
37 P. Chiantera-Stutte, ‘Leadership, Ideology, and Anti-European Politics in the Italian Lega Nord’ 
in D. Caramani, Y. Mény (eds.), Challenges to Consensual Politics. Democracy, Identity, and Populist 
Protest in the Alpine Region, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, Bruxelles et al. 2005, pp. 115-116.
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flected in its inability to unite fully North and South, because the economic, social, 
cultural, and mental differences between these parts of the country are very pro-
nounced. Indeed, it is almost amazing that they remain within the same state. This 
undoubtedly is the most serious shortcoming of Italian statehood.
To conclude, the ideology and operation of the Northern League reflect the basic 
tragedies of Italy, whose roots stretch back into the period of the country’s fragmen-
tation. For the League drew upon the spirit of separatism, which has always been on 
the peninsula, and which has always been hostile to the heritage of Risorgimento: the 
19th century movement that promoted the restoration and unification of the coun-
try. That sort of separatism continues to exist and from time to time still makes its 
presence felt. In the 1990s a sufficient space opened up for separatism as a result of 
a marked crisis in Italian national identity. For centuries, Italy was divided, both po-
litically and culturally. The unified Italian state came into being fairly recently in the 
latter half of the 19th century. At the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries, the powerful 
impact of integration processes in Europe, globalisation and supra-national econom-
ic and financial institutions, as well as the influence of mass culture and the preva-
lence of a consumer lifestyle all served to undermine traditional myths and weaken 
national values. This process was especially visible in Italy, where the state’s founding 
myth proved to be rather weak.
The example of the League kindled the imagination of other Italian separatists, 
who wanted to follow the path it had provided. Supporters of the restitution of the 
Republic of Venice turned up and hung their flags on the Doges’ Palace. In Rome, the 
supporters of the restitution of the Papal States, with the Pope being their sovereign, 
began to organise themselves. Voices that professed admiration for the Kingdom of 
Sicily and the Bourbon Dynasty were also heard, while Sardinia was found to possess 
many people who advocated the island’s independence. None of these movements, 
however, became popular; they have never been more than political curiosities, not 
even venturing into the margins of true politics. Yet politics, and especially during 
periods of crises and turning points, provides numerous examples of curiosities sud-
denly becoming rather more significant, and then influencing the course of history.
Some time ago, Pietro Scoppola remarked that “there is a paradox in the histo-
ry of the republic: normally, the sense of citizenship and the group identity related 
to that are reinforced by a democratic system; the implementation of civil, politi-
cal, and social rights consolidates the common sense and perception of belonging. 
Yet in our country, after fifty years of democracy, national identity has entered into 
a crisis.”38 The various drawbacks of Italian democracy, such as the weakness lack of 
efficiency of state institutions, the failure to bridge the division between the North 
and the South, partycracy, clientelism, and corruption turned out to be highly corro-
sive for the national conscience, as they alienated the state from society and strength-
ened the conviction that it is an alien structure. The democratic and republican 
post-war Italian state wasted its opportunity to play the role of finally and irrevers-
38 P. Scoppola, La repubblica dei partiti…, p. 528.
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ibly reinforcing the nation’s identity. Gian Enrico Rusconi went even further when 
he presented his radical diagnosis, when he warned that the “nation may cease to 
exist.”39 These opinions were formed at the height of the political crisis of the 1990s, 
a crisis that shook the foundations of the state. It was feared that many people might 
reject Italian national identity for a local or European identity. While the Northern 
League and other political initiatives of a similar character promoted the first trend, 
the die-hard Eurocentrists suggested the latter. The most pessimistic predictions did 
not come true. There has been no finis Italiae, which does not, however, mean that 
Italian national identity emerged unscathed from the acute difficulties of coping 
both with the separatism and with the demise of the party system.
At present, Italians still must struggle with the question of whether they indeed 
are a nation, and if so, whether they still should be one. Although, when asked, 
a majority give a positive answer to this question, this includes a large number of 
people who first define themselves by regional or local affiliation, and only after that 
by national affiliation. Italian regional variations are much greater than in any other 
European country.40 Ernesto Galli della Loggia noticed another factor here: “the 
weak Italian national awareness, i.e. the insufficient awareness of the fact that Italians 
are to be a nation and the rare situations when they do manifest their being as a na-
tion, is a central and highly significant fact for the contemporary Italian identity.”41 
If this is correct, then the task of building the Italian nation that Cavour bestowed to 
the Italian state has indeed not yet been accomplished.
39 G.E. Rusconi, Se cessiamo di essere una nazione, Il Mulino, Bologna 1993, p. 7.
40 Cf. S. Vertone (ed.), La cultura degli italiani, Il Mulino, Bologna 1994, p. 93 and S. Sechi (ed.), 
Deconstructing Italy: Italy in the Nineties, University of California, Berkeley 1995, p. 3.
41 E. Galli della Loggia, L’identità italiana, Il Mulino, Bologna 1998, p. 157.
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